What the projections say (2025 → long run)
| Source (latest) | Horizon & metric | U.S. real GDP growth |
| Federal Reserve (SEP, June 2025) | 2025 calendar-year; longer-run trend | 1.4% in 2025; ~1.8% longer-run median (trend). (Federal Reserve) |
| IMF WEO (July 2025 update) | 2025–2026 | 1.9% (2025), 2.0% (2026). (IMF, english.moef.go.kr) |
| OECD Economic Outlook 2025/1 | 2025 (Q4/Q4 pace) | Growth “especially weak”; U.S. ~1.1% to Q4-2025. (OECD) |
| CBO Long-Term Outlook (Mar 2025) | Average 2025–2055 | 1.6% per year (real). (cbo.gov) |
| Social Security Trustees (2025) | Very long run (to ~2100) | Ultimate productivity growth assumed 1.63% (intermediate case), anchoring long-run GDP to ~mid-1%s. (ssa.gov) |
| U.S. Census 2023 Projections | Population to 2100 | Official demographic baselines used by U.S. agencies; show slower population growth/ageing through century’s end (demographic drag on GDP). (Census.gov) |
| BLS (labour force outlook) | To 2033 | Labour force grows just 0.4%/yr—a key brake on potential GDP. (Bureau of Labor Statistics) |
| OMB (Admin. budget assumptions) | 10-yr budgeting horizon | Assumes ~2.1% average real growth—slightly above CBO/Fed trend. (crfb.org) |
Read-across: official U.S. sources (Fed/CBO/SSA/OMB) cluster around ~1½–2% real growth beyond the near term; multilateral forecasters (IMF/OECD) have sub-2% in 2025 and only modest re-acceleration thereafter. Federal Reserve, cbo.gov, ssa.gov, crfb.org, IMF, OECD
Why the slowdown (the structural drivers)
- Ageing & slower labour supply. BLS projects labour-force growth of only 0.4%/yr into the early-2030s; Census projections show ageing deepening through 2100. Less labour-input growth mechanically lowers potential GDP. (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census.gov)
- Middling productivity trend. The Trustees’ 1.63% “ultimate” productivity assumption (intermediate case) pins long-run output to mid-1% unless productivity improves. (ssa.gov)
- High public debt/interest costs. CBO shows debt rising to ~116% of GDP by 2034 (10-yr outlook), with long-run growth averaging 1.6%; Moody’s now assumes debt near 134% of GDP by 2035—a headwind to investment and growth. (cbo.gov. Moody’s Ratings)
- Trade/tariff drag & policy uncertainty. OECD flags a U.S.-centred slowdown in 2025; IMF’s April–July updates marked down U.S. growth earlier on tariff effects before nudging 2025 to 1.9% as effective rates eased—still below recent out-turns. (OECD, IMF)
What the rating agencies say (growth & credit context)
- Moody’s (May 2025): U.S. sovereign downgraded to Aa1 (stable outlook). Moody’s cites rising interest burden and a debt path to ~134% of GDP by 2035; medium-term growth remains modest. (Moody’s)
- Fitch (June 2025): AA+ / Stable. Notes large, persistent fiscal deficits; baseline general-government deficit still ~7.1% of GDP in 2025 even after some revenue improvement. (Fitch Ratings)
- S&P (Mar 2024): AA+ / Stable. Affirms strong institutional capacity and economic depth, but highlights fiscal/interest-cost risks that can weigh on longer-term growth. (S&P Global)
What this implies from 2025 to 2100
- Near term (2025–2027): Most credible baselines centre on ~1.4–2.0% real growth (Fed median 1.4% for 2025; IMF 1.9% for 2025, 2.0% for 2026). (fredblog.stlouisfed.org, IMF)
- Medium term (late-2020s/2030s): Growth converges toward ~1.6–1.8% trend (Fed “longer run” ~1.8%; CBO 1.6% avg to 2055). Absent a productivity lift or materially higher net immigration, potential stays subdued. (Federal Reserve, cbo.gov)
- Long run (to 2100): No single “official” GDP path to 2100 exists, but U.S. official demographics (Census) plus SSA’s productivity anchor imply low-1% population + mid-1% productivity → a long-run GDP growth band broadly around ~1½–2%, depending on immigration and productivity outcomes. Scenario sets (e.g., SSPs/OECD LT scenarios) are consistent with this slow-growth anchor for advanced economies. (Census.gov, ssa.gov, OECD)