The ceasefire is fragile. The armed networks surrounding it are not. And what happens next in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq may matter more than what happens between Tehran and Jerusalem.
Interstate conflict has a grammar that diplomats understand. Proxy warfare does not. When Iran and Israel trade missiles, there are at least interlocutors — back channels, envoys, phone calls between heads of government. When Hezbollah decides it has been given sufficient cause to escalate, or when the Houthis recalculate the cost-benefit of restraint, the architecture of diplomatic management becomes far less reliable.
That is the underappreciated danger in the current ceasefire moment. The guns between Iran and Israel have partially paused. The armed networks that surround this conflict have not stood down.
The Axis of Resistance — and Its Fault Lines
Iran has spent decades constructing what analysts describe as a “forward defence” — a constellation of armed non-state actors positioned to impose costs on adversaries without requiring direct Iranian military engagement. That network now forms the operational risk layer beneath the fragile Iran-Israel-US ceasefire.
Within days of the opening US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February, Hezbollah launched missiles and drones into Israel, prompting a sharp escalation in Israeli air strikes reaching as far north as southern Beirut. A drone believed to have been launched by Hezbollah also struck a British Royal Air Force base in Cyprus — the first time a non-state actor had directly struck NATO-adjacent infrastructure in this conflict cycle.
On 28 March, the Houthis formally entered the war, launching ballistic missiles at Israeli territory — their first direct strike on Israel since the 2025 Gaza ceasefire. The group vowed to continue attacks “until the aggression on all resistance fronts stops,” and threatened a naval blockade targeting vessels belonging to what it described as “aggressor countries.”
In April, the Houthis claimed a joint missile attack on Israel conducted in coordination with Iran and Hezbollah — a level of operational integration that marks a qualitative shift from the previous conflict cycle, when each actor tended to calibrate its involvement independently.
What the Global Terrorism Index 2026 Found
The Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Terrorism Index 2026 — the most comprehensive annual assessment of terrorism trends across 163 countries — captures the structural backdrop against which this militia escalation is unfolding.
Global terrorism deaths declined by 28 per cent in 2025, reaching their lowest level in a decade. But the GTI 2026 warns this improvement may be short-lived, with many negative factors converging in 2026: the escalation of conflicts in Iran and South Asia, deteriorating economic conditions in the West, and rising use of drone technology by terrorist organisations.
The West-versus-global divergence is striking. Deaths from terrorism in the West surged by 280 per cent in 2025 — largely driven by antisemitism, Islamophobia and political violence — even as global figures fell. Youth radicalisation fuelled lone-wolf attacks, with youth terrorism investigations rising threefold since 2021, and 93 per cent of all fatal attacks in the West carried out by lone actors.
The GTI 2026 specifically flags that Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes against Israel and US allies in the Gulf — combined with its long-standing relationships with proxy networks including Hezbollah and the Houthis — mean that the consequences of this escalation will affect the entire region and beyond. The risk of proxy-inspired attacks against US, Israeli and allied interests, both within the Middle East and in Western countries, has risen substantially.
The report also warns that Iran risks becoming another breeding ground for terrorist militias if it becomes a failed state — a scenario that would represent a catastrophic collapse of the proxy model into ungoverned armed fragmentation.
The Red Sea and the Shipping Dimension
The maritime dimension of this conflict has received less attention than the battlefield strikes, but its economic consequences are arguably more broadly felt.
If the Houthis intensify their involvement, they are most likely to resume attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden whilst simultaneously striking Israeli territory. Houthi drone attacks on Red Sea shipping have already disrupted nearly a trillion dollars in annual global trade during previous escalation cycles, forcing major commercial carriers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope — adding weeks to transit times and significant fuel costs to virtually every supply chain connecting Asia, the Gulf and Europe.
The Houthis have also previously struck Saudi oil facilities and present a danger to energy assets across Gulf countries — meaning that any escalation in their operational tempo carries direct implications for global energy prices, regardless of whether the Strait of Hormuz itself is simultaneously contested.
Insurance costs for vessels transiting the region have risen sharply. Several shipping companies have suspended Red Sea operations entirely. The commercial logic of the conflict — the deliberate targeting of economic arteries to impose political pressure — is a defining feature of how these groups operate, and it does not require ceasefire violations at the state level to resume.
Three Networks, Three Risk Profiles
| Actor | Primary Theatre | Capability | Current Status | Global Risk Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hezbollah | Lebanon, northern Israel | Precision rockets, drones, infantry | Active; conditioned on Lebanon ceasefire | Aviation, shipping, diplomacy, civilian infrastructure |
| Houthis | Yemen, Red Sea, Israeli territory | Ballistic missiles, maritime drones | Formally engaged since March 2026 | Red Sea trade, Gulf energy, Israeli ports |
| Iraqi PMF | Iraq, Syria, US bases | Drones, rockets | Selective restraint; capability intact | US military assets, Gulf state infrastructure |
Iraqi militias within the Popular Mobilisation Forces have “a degree of de facto autonomy,” substantial budgets, approximately 200,000 fighters, and are difficult to keep in check at the best of times. Their restraint during the early phases of the conflict reflects calculation, not incapacity.
The Practical Consequences
For governments, corporations, airlines and insurers tracking operational risk, the implications are concrete:
Aviation. Airspace closures over Iran, Lebanon and northern Israel have forced extended rerouting for dozens of carriers. Any resumption of Hezbollah strikes on northern Israel reactivates airport security alerts in Tel Aviv and reopens questions about civilian flight paths through the eastern Mediterranean.
Shipping. Red Sea diversions remain in effect for many carriers. The Houthi threat to Israeli-linked vessels has not been formally withdrawn, and the group’s participation in the war — however calibrated — leaves the maritime corridor legally and operationally hazardous.
Energy. The Strait of Hormuz and Gulf infrastructure face exposure from multiple actors simultaneously. Even threats that never materialise into physical attacks are enough to sustain elevated insurance premiums and production caution.
Diplomatic missions. Threat groups remain active in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Around 15 to 20 per cent of terrorist attacks in 2026 are expected to occur in the Levant and the Gulf, according to counterterrorism assessments. Embassy security protocols across the region have been tightened accordingly.
The Structural Problem Diplomacy Cannot Solve
State-level ceasefires, however fragile, have an identifiable mechanism: governments agree, militaries stand down, monitors deploy. Proxy networks operate on different logic. Their restraint depends on calculations of interest, internal cohesion, and signals from Tehran that may shift independently of whatever Washington and Jerusalem have agreed upon.
The Houthis have increasingly claimed operational autonomy from Iran, reframing their narrative around Arab solidarity rather than explicit Iranian direction — a posture that allows the group to escalate or de-escalate without either Tehran or Washington being able to claim full credit or control for the outcome.
That ambiguity is the central problem. A ceasefire between two states does not bind the networks those states sponsor, influence, or in some cases merely inspire. The Iran-Israel pause, if it holds, removes one escalation vector. It leaves several others entirely intact — armed, motivated, and watching for the next opportunity that the calendar, the battlefield, or the politics of the ceasefire itself provides.