- Accountability for 7 October & Post-War Security Strategy: A central divide between the governing coalition and the opposition concerns the establishment of an independent State Commission of Inquiry (headed by a Supreme Court appointment) into the intelligence and policy failures surrounding 7 October 2023. Whilst the opposition (Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, Golan) demands an immediate statutory state inquiry and regional diplomatic integration, Netanyahu’s coalition favours a politically appointed inquiry panel and indefinite military control over security corridors.
- Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Military Conscription (Hok HaGiyus): For decades, Yeshiva students received rolling exemptions from mandatory IDF service. Following the prolonged wartime manpower shortage and the landmark June 2024 High Court of Justice ruling declaring blanket exemptions unlawful and halting state funding to non-compliant religious seminaries, universal conscription has become the most explosive domestic issue. Secular, centrist, and reservist voters (alongside many religious nationalists who bore heavy battlefield casualties) demand immediate enforcement, whereas Shas and UTJ condition their coalition participation on passing a Basic Law enshrining Torah study as exempt from military service.
- Constitutional Identity & the Judiciary: Because Israel lacks a single codified constitution — relying instead on 14 Basic Laws — elections since 2022 have functioned as referendums on the balance of power between the executive-controlled Knesset and the Supreme Court (sitting as the High Court of Justice).
- The Arithmetic of the Arab Lists & Bloc Stalemate: Arab citizens constitute roughly 21% of Israel’s population and typically elect 10 to 15 MPs across the Joint List and Ra’am. Because right-wing parties refuse to sit with Arab lists and several Zionist opposition parties rule out formal coalitions with anti-Zionist factions within the Joint List, neither the pro-Netanyahu bloc (polling around 49–51 seats) nor the Zionist opposition parties can easily reach 61 seats without either cross-bloc defections or external parliamentary support (safety net) from Arab MPs.
